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neffective assistance of trial counsel is one of the most
frequently raised claims in state and federal postconvic-
tion petitions. This is hardly surprising given reports of
trial attorneys who refuse to investigate their cases before
trial, never meet with their clients before the day of trial,
and fail to file any motions or object to inadmissible evi-
dence offered at trial. Unfortunately, the current structure
of indigent defense funding makes it impossible for many
public defenders to provide effective representation to their
clients.
The American Bar Association recently concluded
that indigent defense in this country is in a state of crisis.
(See ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and In-
digent Defendants, Gideon's Broken Promise: America's
Continuing Quest Jbr Equal Justice (2004).) Many de-
fenders are forced to handle well over a thousand cases
a year, more than three times the number of cases that
the American Bar Association says one attorney can
handle effectively. (See, e.g, Erik Eckholm, Citing Work-
load, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y TIMES, No-
vember 8, 2008.) Public defenders in Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Maryland, and Minnesota, for example, are
unable to handle all of their cases due to budget con-
straints. Georgia recently cut the hourly rate that it pays
appointed counsel in capital cases, fired 41 employees,
and dismantled a number of offices. Virginia places a
$120 cap on the fee that it will pay to an attorney who
handles a juvenile delinquency case, regardless of the se-
verity of the charges. In Louisiana, the primary means
of funding indigent defense is through traffic ticket rev-
enue. When Hurricane Katrina hit, the police stopped
writing traffic tickets, and New Orleans was forced to
lay off almost all of its public defenders. In Mississippi,
defendants may wait up to a year before speaking to
their court-appointed lawyers. And a recent report re-
vealed that certain counties in Michigan routinely deny
indigent criminal defendants access to counsel, leaving
them to represent themselves. With public defenders rep-
resenting 80 percent of criminal defendants nationwide,
the indigent defense crisis is a problem that our criminal
justice system can no longer afford to ignore.
Unfortunately, the very structure of our state and fed-
eral postconviction review systems contributes to the prob-
lem rather than providing a means for redressing it. In
practice, procedural obstacles to review make it difficult for
defendants to challenge the effectiveness of their trial attor-
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neys' performance. As a result, there is no effective means
of detecting and deterring incompetent trial attorney per-
formance and no judicial catalyst for legislative or executive
reform.
The Problem with State Postconviction
Review Procedures
A majority of states require defendants who want to chal-
lenge the effectiveness of their trial attorneys to do so
through postconviction petitions rather than on direct ap-
peal. (See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003).)
In most states, direct appeals are limited to the facts and
issues that are clearly reflected in the trial record. Because
ineffective assistance of counsel claims often involve allega-
tions about a trial attorney's failure to do something, ad-
ditional factual development is frequently required to fully
present the claims. However, the motion for a new trial is
the only mechanism currently available in many jurisdic-
tions to supplement a trial record before appellate review.
Because defense attorneys are given very short time periods
(often less than 30 days) to file such motions, the attorney
who files a motion for a new trial is frequently the same at-
torney who represented the defendant at trial and is unlike-
ly to raise a challenge to his or her own effectiveness. Even
if a defendant files a pro se motion for a new trial or finds
a new lawyer, it is very difficult to reinvestigate the case and
adequately supplement the trial court record with informa-
tion about the trial attorney's deficient performance in such
a short time period.
As a result, the evidence of trial attorney ineffectiveness
is frequently missing from the trial record, and defendants
often cannot raise effective challenges to their trial attor-
neys' performance on direct appeal. For this reason, many
states require defendants to wait until state postconviction,
where there is a built-in mechanism for supplementing the
trial record through evidentiary hearings, to raise these
claims. Requiring defendants to raise ineffectiveness claims
at the state postconviction stage, however, comes at a high
price.
First, there is the problem of delay. In most jurisdictions,
state postconviction proceedings only start once direct ap-
pellate review ends. A defendant's ability to reinvestigate the
case and demonstrate that the trial attorney was ineffective
dwindles with time. Witnesses die or disappear. Evidence is
lost. Memories fade. With direct appeals taking more than
four years in some jurisdictions, the delay drastically de-
creases the likelihood that defendants will be able to mount
effective challenges to their trial attorneys' performance.
The delay also ensures that fewer defendants will raise
claims of trial attorney ineffectiveness. Defendants have
little incentive to challenge their convictions once they have
served their sentences. In fact, in some jurisdictions, defen-
dants who are no longer in custody are not permitted to
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file postconviction challenges. Given the delays inherent
in appellate proceedings, most felons and almost all mis-
demeanants never get to state postconviction review. For
these defendants, there is effectively no opportunity to chal-
lenge their trial attorneys' performance.
Additionally, locating ineffective assistance of trial coun-
sel claims in postconviction proceedings deprives most de-
fendants of any meaningful opportunity to raise the claims
because there is no constitutional right to counsel for post-
conviction challenges. The Supreme Court has held that
indigent defendants who are actually imprisoned after a
criminal conviction have a Sixth Amendment right (incor-
porated through the Fourteenth Amendment) to have the
assistance of an effective lawyer at trial and a Fourteenth
Amendment right to the assistance of an effective lawyer
on their first appeals as of right. (See Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963).) In Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), however, the
Supreme Court cut off the constitutional right to the assis-
tance of counsel after the first appeal. Because defendants
at that point have access to the trial court record, appellate
briefs from the first appeal, and the appellate court's deci-
sion, the Court reasoned that they have meaningful access
to the higher appellate courts and can fairly present their
claims to those courts without the assistance of counsel. As
a result, a state does not violate a defendant's due process
rights when it deprives the defendant of counsel for discre-
tionary appeals.
In Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) and Mur-
ray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), the Supreme Court
used similar logic to hold that defendants have no constitu-
tional right to counsel for postconviction attacks on crimi-
nal judgments after direct appeal (even in capital cases).
Although many states have a statutory right to counsel in
postconviction proceedings, the right is often quite limited.
In some jurisdictions, it only extends to capital defendants;
in others, it only applies if the court gives the defendant
an evidentiary hearing (which is difficult for a defendant to
get without the assistance of counsel). As a result, a large
majority of defendants who file state postconviction chal-
lenges to their criminal convictions do so without the as-
sistance of counsel.
The decision to relegate ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims to state postconviction proceedings and, at
the same time, to deny defendants a right to counsel at that
stage contributes to the indigent defense crisis. How can a
state prisoner reinvestigate the case to support an ineffec-
tive assistance of trial counsel claim from within a prison
cell? If indigent defendants cannot raise challenges to their
trial attorneys' performance until state postconviction re-
view and do not have the means to raise the claims effec-
tively at that stage because they have no counsel to con-
duct the necessary extra-record investigation to support the
claims, then the right to effective trial counsel becomes a
right without a remedy.
The Problem with Federal Habeas
Corpus Review Procedures
Without a meaningful opportunity to challenge their inef-
fective trial attorneys' performance in state postconviction
proceedings, some defendants turn to the federal courts.
They file habeas corpus petitions alleging that they are be-
ing held in violation of their constitutional rights because
the states violated their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to effective counsel. These habeas petitioners, howev-
er, must successfully maneuver through a complex obstacle
course of procedural requirements before the federal courts
will entertain their constitutional arguments. Moreover, as
with state postconviction review, these habeas petitioners
have no constitutional right to counsel to help them navi-
gate the tangled procedural maze. There are a number of
procedural barriers to federal habeas review, but this article
will discuss two that particularly affect defendants' abili-
ties to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims-
namely, procedural default and the availability of eviden-
tiary hearings.
Procedural default. In many cases, the federal courts
will deem defendants' ineffective assistance of trial coun-
sel claims waived on the basis of the defendants' failure to
comply with state procedural rules. Grounded in principles
of federalism and finality as well as concerns about con-
serving resources, the procedural default doctrine requires
federal habeas courts to respect adequate and independent
state procedural grounds for denying federal constitutional
claims. If a state prisoner fails to comply with the state's
procedural requirements for raising a federal constitutional
claim and the state courts refuse to address the underlying
federal claim as a result, the federal courts will respect the
state rules and similarly refuse to address the underlying
federal claim. (See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002).)
Consider the following example: A state procedural
rule requires defendants to object contemporaneously to
the improper admission of evidence. A defense attorney
in one case fails to object to evidence that is offered in
violation of the defendant's confrontation clause rights,
and the evidence is admitted. When the defendant at-
tempts later to challenge the admission of the evidence,
the state courts deem the argument waived because of
the failure to comply with the state procedural rule. The
federal courts will rely on the procedural default doc-
trine to refuse to address the confrontation clause claim
in federal habeas.
There are two exceptions to the application of the pro-
cedural default doctrine. First, if a defendant can show
cause for failing to comply with the state procedural rule
and prejudice to the outcome of the case, then the fed-
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eral court will bypass the procedural default and con-
sider the merits of the underlying constitutional claim.
(See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).) To dem-
onstrate "cause" for a procedural default, the habeas pe-
titioner must present reasons for failing to comply with
the state's procedural rules. In general, "the existence of
cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on
whether the prisoner can show that some objective fac-
tor external to the defense impeded [the defendant's] ef-
forts to comply with the state procedural rules." (Murray
v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).) Examples of such
external factors include a change in the law or interfer-
ence by state officials. Alternatively, if a defendant can
demonstrate that he or she is actually innocent of the
underlying criminal offense, the federal court will look
beyond the procedural default to address the underlying
constitutional claim. (See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298
(1995).)
Many defendants seeking federal habeas relief on the
basis of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim
lawyers or who are fortunate enough to find attorneys
who are willing to take on their cases pro bono do not
fare much better. If their lawyers miss a deadline or fail
to comply with a state procedure in some other way,
their ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are
lost unless they can make a showing of actual innocence,
which is nearly impossible to do. The federal courts will
not view the ineffectiveness of a postconviction attorney
as cause sufficient to bypass a procedural default. Only
attorney error that rises to the level of a constitutional
violation can be cause to excuse a procedural default.
Since there is no constitutional right to a postconvic-
tion lawyer, any mistakes that a postconviction lawyer
makes, no matter how egregious, are attributable to the
client and can form the basis of a procedural default.
(See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).) As a
result, a state prisoner who has both an ineffective post-
conviction lawyer and an ineffective trial lawyer is likely
to face an insurmountable procedural default in federal
court. In short, the more ineffective attorneys a defen-
run head-on into the procedural default doctrine. Be-
cause a majority of states require defendants to raise in-
effectiveness challenges in state postconviction proceed-
ings and because most states do not provide defendants
with the assistance of effective counsel at the postconvic-
tion stage, many defendants fail to preserve the claims.
Consider the following typical scenario: A defendant
wants to allege that his or her trial attorney was con-
stitutionally ineffective because the attorney failed to
meet with the defendant, file a single motion, or do any
investigation before trial. The appellate lawyer tells the
defendant to wait until state postconviction proceedings
to raise that claim. After the defendant loses on appeal,
he or she is told that there is no additional right to the
assistance of counsel. The defendant misses the dead-
line for the postconviction filing and files an untimely
pro se state postconviction petition. The state courts
hold that the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim
is defaulted due to the failure to present the claim in a
timely fashion in accordance with the state's procedural
rules. When the defendant goes into federal court, the
federal court will honor the state default and refuse to
address the claim unless the defendant can, without the
assistance of counsel, show innocence.
State prisoners who can afford to hire postconviction
dant has, the less likely the defendant is to obtain relief
in federal court.
The availability of evidentiary hearings. Those habeas
petitioners who manage to comply with their state pro-
cedural rules and adequately preserve their ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims for federal review face
yet another procedural hurdle to obtaining relief on a
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel-namely,
the restrictions on the availability of evidentiary hear-
ings. By statute, if a defendant fails to develop the fac-
tual basis for a claim in state court, the federal habeas
courts are not permitted to grant an evidentiary hearing
unless the defendant can show (1) by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that he or she is innocent of the underlying
offense and (2) that the claim relies on either (a) a new
rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the U.S.
Supreme Court or (b) a factual predicate that could not
have been discovered previously through due diligence.
(See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).)
Federal habeas petitioners who want to challenge their
trial attorneys' ineffectiveness are often in the position of
needing to supplement their state court records. After all,
most of them did not have the assistance of lawyers in
state postconviction proceedings. As a result, they often
have failed to unearth all of the potential evidence of poor
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trial attorney performance by the time they get to federal
court. The federal courts, however, attribute the failure to
develop the state court record to these pro se defendants
and, as a result, prevent them from obtaining hearings to
present evidence of ineffective trial attorney performance.
Thus, once again, defendants who received inadequate
trial representation are left with no judicial remedy
Some Partial Solutions
The structural decisions to (1) relegate ineffective as-
sistance of trial counsel claims to state postconviction
review; (2) deny defendants a constitutional right to
counsel for postconviction proceedings; (3) procedurally
default these claims in federal court; and (4) routinely
deny defendants' requests for federal evidentiary hear-
ings to support the claims have left no meaningful post-
conviction check on incompetent trial attorney perfor-
mance. Without a judicial catalyst, the elected branches
of government are unlikely to take significant action to
solve the problem. After all, it is never popular for legis-
lators or executive officials to be "soft on crime."
Some argue that we should abandon postconviction
processes entirely as a means of solving the counsel crisis
and rely on private civil rights class actions to catalyze
reform. Advocacy groups have recently begun filing such
actions in state and federal courts across the country.
These attempts to obtain structural classwide relief are
clearly a positive development, but they need not be the
only approach to redressing right-to-counsel problems.
Removing or softening some of the structural obstacles
that prevent postconviction litigants from effectively
challenging trial attorneys' performance would force the
state and federal judiciaries to focus on the indigent de-
fense crisis and could similarly catalyze reform.
Option 1: Limited Constitutional
Right to Postconviction Counsel
Some scholars have suggested that the federal courts
should recognize a limited constitutional right to coun-
sel in state postconviction proceedings in order to raise
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Supreme
Court left open this possibility in Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722 (1991). Roger Coleman was convicted of
rape and capital murder and sentenced to death. After
his direct appeal ended, he filed a state postconviction
petition alleging that his trial attorney was constitution-
ally ineffective. He lost in the trial court, but with the
aid of some lawyers working pro bono, he appealed.
Because his lawyers filed his postconviction appeal one
day too late, the state courts dismissed the appeal. The
federal courts held that his ineffectiveness claim was
procedurally defaulted. Coleman argued that he satis-
fied the cause and prejudice exception to the procedural
default doctrine. Specifically, he claimed that his state
postconviction attorneys were ineffective in failing to file
a timely appeal and that their ineffectiveness was a factor
external to him that impeded his efforts to comply with
the state rule.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, noting that
"[b]ecause Coleman had no right to counsel to pursue his
appeal in state habeas, any attorney error that led to the
default of Coleman's claims in state court cannot consti-
tute cause to excuse the default in federal habeas." (Id.
at 756-57.) However, the Supreme Court was careful in
limiting the scope of its holding. It noted that it was not
addressing the question of whether there might be a lim-
ited constitutional right to counsel "in those cases where
state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can
present a challenge to his conviction." (Id. at 755.) More
specifically, the Supreme Court reserved the question of
whether there might be a limited constitutional right to
counsel for initial postconviction review proceedings in
which claims are raised that cannot be raised earlier-
claims such as ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The Supreme Court's rationale for cutting off the
right to counsel after direct appeal would support recog-
nition of the limited exception left open in Coleman. In
Ross, Finley, and Giarratano, the Court emphasized that
a defendant's access to the trial record, appellate briefs
from the first appeal as of right, and the appellate court
decision would sufficiently inform the defendant of all
of the claims such that the defendant could fairly present
any claims pro se in discretionary appeals and later post-
conviction proceedings. This presupposes that a defen-
dant is able to present all claims challenging the lawful-
ness of the conviction either at trial or in a first appeal.
This may have been a fair assumption when Ross, Finley,
and Giarratano were decided. Then, some state and fed-
eral prisoners were raising ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims on direct appeal. That is no longer true in
a majority of states. (See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813
A.2d 726, 735-38 & n.13 (Pa. 2002) (describing the trend
toward relocating ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims to state postconviction proceedings).) Defendants
who are filing their first postconviction review petitions
in these states have never had the assistance of counsel in
identifying, investigating, researching, or presenting inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel claims. There is no ap-
pellate brief on the claim on which they can rely, and no
appellate court decision has ever been issued addressing
the claim. Litigants should argue that the circumstances
in a majority of states are different now from what they
were when earlier federal cases rejected the Coleman ex-
ception. Perhaps it is time for state and federal courts
to recognize a limited right to postconviction counsel to
raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE U FALL 2009
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Option 2: Move Ineffective Assistance
Claims to Direct Appeal
Alternatively, attorneys could advocate the relocation of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims to direct ap-
peal. A minority of states has opted to allow defendants to
raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct
appeal rather than forcing them to wait until state postcon-
viction review. These states provide a mechanism for defen-
dants to open and supplement their trial records on direct
appeal and make it the responsibility of the defendant's ap-
pellate attorney to conduct the necessary investigation to
determine whether an ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim should be raised and whether extra-record develop-
ment of that claim is necessary.
Such a procedure has a number of beneficial conse-
quences. First, it decreases substantially the delay that ac-
companies relegating these claims to state postconviction
review. When the claims are raised closer to the time of the
trial, witnesses and evidence are more likely to be available,
and the state's interest in finality is not nearly as compro-
mised by the need for a retrial. Additionally, when there is
less delay, more defendants have a realistic opportunity to
file challenges. They will still be feeling the effects of their
criminal convictions and will have an incentive to raise inef-
fectiveness challenges. When more defendants raise struc-
tural challenges to the indigent defense delivery system, the
judiciary gets a clearer picture of the nature of the problem.
The fact that reversals are closer in time to the actual trials
also means that the judiciary can send a strong deterrent
message back to the offending state actors. Perhaps more
importantly, moving ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims from postconviction to direct appeal ensures that de-
fendants have lawyers to help them raise these claims.
That said, moving ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims to direct appeal does have costs. Consideration of
other potentially meritorious claims will be delayed in some
cases in order to give the appellate attorney time to reinves-
tigate the case and supplement the trial record. Moreover,
it is more expensive for the state to fund indigent defense
when it has to pay appellate attorneys to take on the addi-
tional responsibility of reinvestigating and raising ineffec-
tive assistance of trial counsel claims. As with all proposed
structural changes, there are tradeoffs involved in this pro-
posal. I believe the tradeoffs are worth it, because there is no
right as fundamental to the defendant as the right to have
the assistance of an effective attorney A defendant's trial
attorney is the conduit through which all other constitu-
tional rights are asserted. Moving ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claims to direct appeal would focus the courts
on the indigent defense crisis and might catalyze desper-
ately needed reforms.
Of course, moving ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims to direct appeal is not a complete solution to the indi-
gent defense crisis. With no constitutional right to counsel in
state postconviction proceedings and no opportunity to raise
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel until state postcon-
viction proceedings, there is no meaningful check on the ap-
pellate attorney's performance. A defendant who has a bad
trial attorney and a bad appellate attorney will have to wait
until state postconviction (where there is no right to a lawyer)
to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure
to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The chances of
a pro se petitioner failing to properly raise and preserve that
claim are high. Although it is not a perfect solution, moving
ineffectiveness challenges to direct appeal is better than rel-
egating them to postconviction where defendants are much
less likely to have the assistance of a lawyer to identify, inves-
tigate, research, and present the claims.
Option 3: Adequacy Challenges
to State Procedural Rules
Federal habeas litigants can also push the evolution of fed-
eral procedural doctrines in a way that makes it easier for
state prisoners to present ineffective assistance of trial coun-
sel claims in federal habeas proceedings. Take, for example,
the procedural default doctrine. In order to procedurally
default a federal constitutional claim, the underlying state
procedural rule that the defendant failed to comply with
must be both an adequate and independent state procedur-
al rule. If a state procedural rule is inconsistently applied
across defendants, it is not an adequate basis upon which
to predicate a procedural bar. (See James v. Kentucky, 466
U.S. 341 (1984).) If the way in which a state rule is applied
unduly burdens the defendant's exercise of his/her constitu-
tional rights, the federal court will refuse to recognize a pro-
cedural default. (See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002).)
Federal habeas litigants facing potential defaults should
examine how the underlying state procedural rules operate
and raise adequacy challenges when the procedures (either
individually or in combination with other state rules) signif-
icantly compromise defendants' abilities to present federal
constitutional challenges.
State prisoners who are convicted in states that relegate
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims to postconvic-
tion should consider challenging the adequacy of the state
procedural rules about raising ineffective assistance claims.
If the state does not provide counsel for raising these claims
and does not make evidentiary hearings to supplement the
record readily available to prisoners, one could argue that
the state procedural scheme is inadequate such that a fail-
ure to properly and completely raise an ineffectiveness chal-
lenge at the postconviction stage cannot be the basis for a
procedural default in federal court.
Even in the minority of states where ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claims are raised on direct appeal, the proce-
dures that the state uses for raising the challenges may not
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be evenly applied or may unduly burden defendants' consti-
tutional rights to effective counsel. For example, Oklahoma
had a state procedural rule that allowed defendants alleging
ineffective assistance of trial counsel to ask the appellate
court for a remand to the trial court in order to have an evi-
dentiary hearing on the claim. In practice, however, the ap-
pellate courts almost never granted hearings despite frequent
requests. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
state procedural rule requiring defendants to raise ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal or waive
them was inadequate as applied to defendants with extra-
record ineffectiveness challenges, because the state did not
evenhandedly provide all defendants with a fair opportunity
to raise the claim at that stage. (See Breechen v. Reynolds, 41
F3d 1343, 1364 (10th Cir. 1994).) More habeas petitioners
should consider raising adequacy challenges, both individual
and structural, to state procedural rules prescribing how inef-
fective assistance of trial counsel claims must be raised.
Option 4: More Federal Evidentiary Hearings
Litigants could also push the doctrine surrounding the
availability of evidentiary hearings to be more receptive to
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. As discussed
above, habeas petitioners who need federal evidentiary
hearings to supplement their ineffective assistance of trial
counsel claims often run into statutory restrictions on the
availability of evidentiary hearings
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).) However,
those statutory constraints only
restrict the availability of eviden-
tiary hearings in cases in which the
defendant "fail[s] to develop the
factual basis of [the] claim in State
court proceedings." (Id)
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
420 (2000), the Supreme Court held
that the statutory restrictions on the
availability of evidentiary hearings
do not apply when the defendant is
not at fault for the failure to develop
the claim in state court. Specifically,
the Court noted that "a person is
not at fault when his diligent efforts
to perform an act are thwarted,
for example, by the conduct of an-
other or by happenstance." (Id. at
432.) Rather, there must be "a lack
of diligence, or some greater fault,
attributable to the prisoner or the
prisoner's counsel." (Id) A prisoner
acts diligently, the Court explained,
when he/she makes "a reasonable
attempt, in light of the information
in federal court. (See
available at the time, to investigate and pursue claims in state
court." (Id at 435.)
Habeas petitioners who did not have the assistance of
counsel to raise ineffectiveness challenges in state postcon-
viction proceedings can use the defendant-friendly lan-
guage in Williams to argue that the statutory restrictions on
the availability of evidentiary hearings do not apply to their
cases. When a defendant is imprisoned and is not entitled
to counsel, the defendant has no opportunity to investigate.
As a result, the information available at the time to raise an
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim is minimal. For
this reason, defendants who do not have a full state court
record to support their ineffectiveness claims often have de-
ficient records through no fault of their own. Rather, the
structure of the state process prevented them from having
a meaningful opportunity to develop a record. As a result,
their abilities to obtain evidentiary hearings in federal court
should not be restricted.
Conclusion
Our current system of defense representation is broken,
and the failure of postconviction review to check ineffective
trial attorney performance is one large part of the prob-
lem. Procedural barriers to review in state and federal court
should be revisited so that the attention of the judiciary is
focused on the indigent defense crisis. Perhaps then, there
will be a chance for meaningful and lasting reforms. m
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